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Abstract: Between 2016-2018 the international community under the auspices of the UN 
adopted two new instruments, both entitled Compacts, one for refugees, the other for safe, 
orderly and regular migration. In this contribution we examine the consequences of the 
adoption of the migration compact in international law. The issue has been much disputed, 
not least by the US authorities which encouraged (unsuccessfully) states not to adopt the 
instrument because of its capacity to contribute to the establishment of new international law 
norms. In our view the Compact is capable of aiding the interpretation of existing 
international human rights conventions as regards their application to migrants.  
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Global Compact on Migration: Paragraph 7: “This Global Compact presents a non-legally 
binding, cooperative framework that builds on the commitments agreed upon by Member 
States in the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. It fosters international 
cooperation among all relevant actors on migration, acknowledging that no State can address 
migration alone, and upholds the sovereignty of States and their obligations under 
international law.” 
Global Compact on Migration: Paragraph 15(f) “The Global Compact is based on 
international human rights law and upholds the principles of non-regression and non-
discrimination. By implementing the Global Compact, we ensure effective respect for and 
protection and fulfilment of the human rights of all migrants, regardless of their migration 
status, across all stages of the migration cycle. We also reaffirm the commitment to eliminate 
all forms of discrimination, including racism, xenophobia and intolerance, against migrants 
and their families;” 
US Mission to the UN: Statement 7 December 2018 “We believe the Compact and the 
process that led to its adoption, including the New York Declaration, represent an effort by 
the United Nations to advance global governance at the expense of the sovereign right of 
States to manage their immigration systems in accordance with their national laws, policies, 
and interests... Unlike standard titles for international instruments, ‘compact’ has no settled 
meaning in international law, but it implies legal obligation. Hence, the Compact is amenable 
to claims that its commitments are legal obligations or at least evidence of international 
consensus on universal legal principles. The United States objects to any such claims and 
holds that neither the Compact nor any commitments by States to implement its objectives 
 
1 Many thanks to the Mitacs GLobalink Research Award program, the generous support of which made this 
research possible. 
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create any legal obligations on UN Member States or create new rights or protections for 
foreign nationals as a matter of conventional or customary international law.” 
I. Introduction 
The UN General Assembly on 19 September 2016 adopted unanimously a resolution entitled 
the New York Declaration which called for the negotiation and adoption of two Compacts, 
one for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (Compact) and one on Refugees. As a 
consequence, between 2016 and 2018, the UN initiated, examined, negotiated and adopted 
two Global Compacts. The USA participated in the adoption of the New York Declaration. 
As regards the Migration Compact, it remained a participant in the process until the end of 
the first phase, stock taking, in December 2017. At that point, dissatisfied with the process it 
rather flamboyantly withdrew at the Mexico conference which initiated the second phase, the 
negotiations. It voted against the Migration Compact at the UN General Assembly on 19 
December 2018. The USA remained part of the negotiation of the Refugee Compact until the 
very end but voted against it too on 16 December 2018. Quite rightly, according to the US 
Mission statement, the term ‘compact’ was new to the UN and its meaning unclear, though 
this is not to imply that there is greater clarity at the time of writing. We only consider the 
position of the first Compact here.  
The Compact is the result of an extensive and multi-phased deliberative process involving 
states, non-governmental organizations, and civil society. Following the 2016 action plan, the 
Compact was adopted at the Marrakesh Intergovernmental Conference by 164 UN Member 
States and then endorsed on 19 December 2018 (not adopted or affirmed) by the UN General 
Assembly by majority, with 152 votes in favour, 5 against (Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, 
Poland, and the USA) and 12 abstentions. The Compact is a response “to the growing global 
phenomenon of large movements of refugees and migrants”2 and the fragmentation of the 
sources of international migration law.3 As the UN Special Representative of the Secretary 
 
2 UN. New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, UN Doc A/RES/71/1, para. 2 (6 October 2016). The 
framing of the Migration Compact stems also from the UN development arena, in particular, Goal 10.7 of the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development to “[f]acilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and 
mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well managed migration policies,” 
available at: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>; see also Michele Klein 
Solomon & Suzanne Sheldon, The Global Compact for Migration: From the Sustainable Development Goals to 
a Comprehensive Agreement on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,30:4 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF 
REFUGEE LA 584 (2018). 
3 See eg. ALEXANDER BETTS, GLOBAL MIGRATION GOVERNANCE (2011); Vincent Chetail, 
Conceptualizing International Migration Law, 110 ASIL. PROC. 201 (2017); Vincent Chetail, The Architecture 
of International Migration Law: A Deconstructivist Design of Complexity and Contradiction, 111 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (2017); Susan Martin, The legal and normative framework of 
international migration, A paper prepared for the Policy Analysis and Research Programme of the Global 
Commission on International Migration, (September 2005), available at: 
<https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/GCIM_TP9.pdf>. See also, Elspeth Guild et al, What is a 
Compact? Migrants’ Rights and State Responsibilities Regarding the Design of the UN Global Compact for 
Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, RAOUL WALLENBERG INSTITUTE, (2017) available at: 
<https://rwi.lu.se/publications/compact-migrants-rights-state-responsibilities-regarding-design-un-global-
compact-safe-orderly-regular-migration/>: the authors note that in the absence of an instrument similar to the 
1951 Refugee Convention, “international migration law relies, on the one hand, on international labour law and 
general human rights law and, on the other hand, the growing network of bilateral and regional agreement in 
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General on Migration stated, “[t]he global compact on migration could bundle agreed norms 
and principles into a global framework agreement with both binding and non-binding 
elements and identify areas in which States may work together towards the conclusion of new 
international norms and treaties.”4 El Salvador’s representative was more succinct, stating at 
the end of the process by which time aspirations towards legally binding elements had 
receded, that “[w]e are not talking about anything new … Rather we are tidying up.”5  
In this debate about the legal status of the Compact it is important to bear in mind that 
international law is not stagnant, it develops to meet the needs of the international 
community. As such instruments which have been adopted in non-legally binding forms do 
change their status through usage. This is most evident in respect of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights adopted as a UN resolution in 1948. Its relatively weak legal 
status as a resolution has not impeded its impact on international human rights law. While the 
UN human rights conventions are derived from it, the Declaration in itself is frequently 
treated as a source of international law in itself in many jurisdictions.   
The Compact, with its 45 references to human rights, thus aggregates existing international 
law with respect to migrants.6 But is it an authoritative comment on existing State obligations 
with respect to the human rights of migrants? The first step to understanding this question is 
to examine the non-legally binding nature of the Compact.    
II. Non-Legally Binding 
The Preamble of the Compact states that the Compact represents a “non-legally binding, 
cooperative framework.” But as the UN Special Representative stated at the start of the 
process, the outcome was initially expected to be a mix of binding and non-binding elements. 
At the commencement of the negotiations, it was not apparent that the Compact would be so 
strenuously ‘non-legally’ binding. Among the actors who argued most forcefully for this 
characteristic was the European Commission (an institution of the European Union). As a 
result of the EU’s internal constitutional order, the Commission could only mount a claim to 
exclusivity in the negotiation and adoption of the Compact if it was non-legally binding.7 
Notwithstanding the success of the ‘non-binding’ campaign at the UN to which the 
Commission contributed substantially, it failed to obtain the necessary approval from its own 
Member States for exclusivity and so the whole effort was pointless from an EU 
 
regard to different aspects of migration management, governing in particular readmission, border control and 
labour migration quotas” (7).  
4 UN, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Migration, UN Doc A/71/728, para. 87 
(3 February 2017). 
5 United Nations, General Assembly Endorses First-Ever Global Compact on Migration, Urging Cooperation 
among Member States in Protecting Migrants, (19 December 2018), available at: 
<https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12113.doc.htm>.  
6 As the Compact states at para 15, it is “based on international human rights law and upholds the principles of 
non-regression and non-discrimination;” see also Elspeth Guild, The UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and 
Regular Migration: What Place for Human Rights? 30:4 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF REFUGEE LAW 
661 (2018). 
7 Paula García Andrade, The role of the European Parliament in the adoption of non-legally binding agreements 
with third countries in THE DEMOCRATISATION OF EU INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THROUGH EU 
LAW 115-131(Juan Santos Vara, Soledad Rodríguez & Sánchez-Tabernero, eds., 2018) 
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constitutional perspective.8 Also, the statements of non-legally binding effect did not unite 
European states behind the Compact, as the vote revealed. However, it contributed to the 
oddity of the Compact’s status as non-legally binding but based on binding international 
human rights treaties.  
A well co-ordinated social media campaign in the autumn of 2018 against the Compact 
demonised the process, contents and actors. The campaign claimed, among other things, that 
the Compact would create a right to migrate – something of a surprise to everyone involved 
in the process.9 However, the campaign was sufficiently powerful to result in the fall of the 
Belgian Government,10 to influence a number of Central and Eastern European countries to 
abandon it and to require the British Government to prepare an official justification for 
supporting the Compact.11 The impact of the campaign was greatest in Europe and North 
America, as the final vote indicates.12 
Yet the blanket statement of non-legally binding effect does not do justice to the “composite” 
nature of the Compact, which amalgamates pre-existing hard and soft law commitments 
contained in some international human rights treaties, in addition to laying out a diverse set of 
principles that can be used to interpret legislation, and open-ended aspirational statements. 
This is a classic example of ‘hard’ law deriving from binding commitments being mixed with 
‘soft’ law arising from instruments without that effect. The Compact arrived on the 
international scene at a time when legal scholarship has been reassessing the meaning of 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law. The division of international instruments into these groups was 
becoming increasingly unsatisfactory. The international legal shorthand of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
law harkens back to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which 
sets out what the sources of law are for the purposes of the deliberations of the ICJ in the 
settlement of disputes among states.13 In this context ‘hard’ law consists of what is set out in 
that provision: (a) international conventions; (b) international custom; (c) general principles 
of international law and (d) possibly (but not automatically) judicial decisions and the 
 
8 Melin, Pauline,The Global Compact for Migration: Lessons for the Unity of EU Representation, 21:2 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF MIGRATION AND LAW 194 (2019) 
9 Laurens Cerulus & Eline Schaart, How the UN Migration pact got trolled, Politico, 3 January 2019 updated 19 
April 2019, available at: < https://www.politico.eu/article/united-nations-migration-pact-how-got-trolled/>. 
10 Elspeth Guild, Tugba Basaran & Kathryn Allinson,From Zero to Hero? An analysis of the human rights 
protections within the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), INTERNATIONAL 
MIGRATION (2019) 
11 The consequence of over 100,000 signatures to a petition that the UK should not agree to the UN’s Compact 
for Migration, available at: <https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/232698>.  
12 Kathleen Newland, The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration: An Unlikely Achievement, 
30:4 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF REFUGEE LAW 657 (2019). 
13 Article 38: “1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as 
are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the 
contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties 
agree thereto.” 
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teachings of the most highly qualified publicists – but this is a subsidiary means of 
determining rules of law (opinion juris). The Court can only take enumerated sources into 
account, though the solidity of sources (b) (c) and (d) is rather variable. There is nothing 
surprising about this as states are particularly concerned about what counts as law for the 
purposes of dispute resolution. In the Statute they wished to be very clear on the basis of what 
instruments the Court would be entitled to determine cases (in which they themselves were 
parties). We will return to Article 38(1)(b) – international custom which constitutes the basis 
of customary international law (CIL) shortly.  
The other main provision dealing with what international law is, and therefore what counts as 
hard law, is Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VLCT).14 The same 
concern informed this provision as Article 38 of the ICJ Statute – states wished to be very 
clear about what constitutes law for the purposes of determining how treaties should be 
interpreted (also ultimately by courts, including the ICJ). Some semblance of a definition of 
what a treaty is emerges from the provision – this (this what?) is the foundation of 
international law according to the VCLT. But the definition of a treaty is qualified by the 
possibility to take into account a number of subsidiary instruments or actions: (a) any 
agreement relating to a treaty made by the parties in connexion (or connection?) with it and 
accepted by the other parties; (b) any instrument made in connection with the conclusion of a 
treaty and accepted; and further, account shall be taken of (c) any subsequent agreement of 
the parties; (d) subsequent practice in a treaty’s application and (e) any relevant rules of 
international law. Article 31(3)(b) permitting the inclusion of “subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation” permits the possibility that instruments which are not ‘hard’ law can be taken 
into consideration in the interpretation of treaties including by the courts where states 
themselves use those instruments for this purpose and that usage has become evidence of 
agreement by the parties in this regard.15 
 
14 Article 31 VCLT: Article 31 (3)(b) 
Article 31: “General rule of interpretation 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its 
preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the 
conclusion of the treaty;  
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and 
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of 
its provisions;  
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation;  
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.4. A special meaning 
shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.” 
15 MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF 
TREATIES (2009); OLIVER DÖRR & KIRSTEN SCHMALENBACH, VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE 
LAW OF TREATIES (2011). 
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Soft law, is everything else, in the sense of delineating “goals to be achieved in the future 
rather than actual duties, programs rather than prescriptions, guidelines rather than strict 
obligations.”16 These so called soft law instruments are supposed to be excluded from being 
possible (direct) sources of law which the ICJ can use in determining disputes before it or in 
respect of which states could claim VCLT applicability. But the existence of practice as part 
of the means to determine state obligations brings evidence, which can include soft law, into 
the equation. The separation of law and evidence is qualified as evidence of practice. This 
evidence is a means of determining what is law.17 So, even strict adherence to a restrictive 
interpretation of these rules permits evidence to creep in. The legal passerelle (what does this 
word mean?) for soft law into hard law, according to the ICJ Statute and the VCLT is through 
international custom and subsequent practice (bundled together as opinio juris) which has 
become another venue of intense academic debate. We will examine this in more depth below 
in particular when looking at the role of the International Law Commission. This is part of 
the process which Chinkin has described as the continuum between jus cogens and non-law.18  
The Principles of Non-Regression and Non-Discrimination 
The Compact states that it is based on the principles of non-regression and non-
discrimination. Non-regression is a term which is infrequently used in international human 
rights law. It is used in environmental law and appears in labour law. The principle is that a 
state’s commitment towards a particular objective prohibits it from taking action which 
diverges from the objective. In legal terms it resembles a standstill provision where the law at 
the time of the entry into force of the commitment must be maintained or changed only in the 
direction of the political commitment which has been undertaken. In human rights law terms, 
this means that while human rights instruments set a floor of rights below which no state 
party can fall, where a state has higher standards, these cannot be reduced to the detriment of 
the individuals enjoying those human rights without offending against the non-regression 
principle. In the form of a standstill provision, this principle has been the subject of  
substantial legal analysis in the European Union. 
Non-discrimination in the context of border control and immigration governance is equally 
problematic. There are two main issues which arise – what is the personal scope and what is 
the material scope of the prohibition. The issue is that if non-discrimination means literally 
that citizens and foreigners must be treated equally then there is no place for border controls 
or immigration governance which are founded on the principle of discrimination on the basis 
of nationality. What citizens are entitled to is part of each state’s constitutional settlement 
 
16 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12  MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 420, 428 (1991). 
17 ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 
(1995). 
18 See eg. Christine M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 
38 INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 850 (1989), noting that “[i]t is no longer 
possible to assume that a proposition is either legally binding norm or not, for that ignores the different status 
that might be claimed for a proposition according to its context and desired goal,” adding that the “international 
order cannot be viewed on a simple linear scale progressing from non-law at one extreme to jus cogens at the 
other, but rather as a continuum in which there is a constant complex interlocking between jus cogens and non-
law or soft law” (865).	
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around rights and duties. What those same citizens are entitled to when abroad, that is when 
the magic of the border has been played and their status has changed from citizens in their 
own state to foreigners in another state, depends on the law of that other state where they are 
seeking to enter.  
Generally, courts, both national and regional, have been quick to confirm states’ sovereign 
claims to the right to admit or refuse entry to their territory to foreigners. Their treatment 
when admitted to the territory of a country of which they are not citizens is also given a wide 
margin of appreciation when challenged on human rights grounds. There is a creeping 
disbelief among courts regarding the claims of necessity which some states make about the 
imperative to treat foreigners particularly harshly. But this concern is rarely couched in the 
language of non-discrimination. An exception at the international level is the case before the 
ICJ regarding the threatened collective expulsion of all Qataris from the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE).19 The Qatari government’s legal basis for its claim that the UAE is acting 
illegally is the UN Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD).20 ICERD was designed to combat racial discrimination except as regards borders 
and migration controls. It specifically states that nothing in the convention affects states’ 
rights to control their borders, immigration or citizenship decisions.21 However, so far in the 
proceedings before the ICJ, the Court has given a preliminary ruling in favour of Qatar, 
requiring UAE not to expel the Qataris resident there until there has been a full hearing of the 
case.22 The question of the scope of ICERD (whether it is actually applicable to the facts of 
the case or is excluded because the matter is one of immigration) has been reserved to the full 
hearing. 
The implications of the case are obvious for the Compact. If ICERD applies to state decisions 
on collective expulsion can it apply more widely to the Compact as the embodiment of treaty 
law regarding the principle of non-discrimination? Is it the international treaty manifestation 
of the legal principle of non-discrimination which the Compact champions?  
The ‘Compact’ Problem 
In “What is a Compact,” the authors suggest that the Compact is bound to become an 
important soft-law instrument despite the reservation of States.23 They enumerate three 
principle reasons: 1. Technical and standard-setting norms enumerated in the Compact, while 
 
19 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar 
v. United Arab Emirates) ICJ 11 June 2018. 
20 UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
21 December 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, p. 195, available at: 
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3940.html>.  
21 Article 1(3) CERD: “Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal 
provisions of States Parties concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that such provisions 
do not discriminate against any particular nationality.” 
22 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, Preliminary 
Jugdment 23 July 2018. 
23 See eg. Elspeth Guild et al, supra note 3.The authors state that, “[b]etween the hard law commitments of the 
conventions and the ‘soft’ instruments of reports and recommendations falls the form of a compact” (6). 
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not formally binding, may nevertheless have significant impacts on influencing state 
behaviour;24 2. Common principles, commitments, and understandings enumerated in the 
Compact may come to have a “norm-filling”25 role as interpretive guides with respect to 
existing international law; 3. The Compact may, as envisioned by the Sutherland Report, 
pave the way for binding international law in the form of either custom or treaty. At this 
point, what may happen in the future, especially within the controversial domain of 
immigration governance, is bound up with a certain degree of speculation and wishful 
thinking. What is clear, however, is that the Compact represents, at the very least, a clarified 
position held by a very large majority of UN Member States with respect to the regulation on 
the transnational movement of migrants,26 with the added emphasis of the Compact’s non-
regressive nature (see above).   
According to the UK, the Compact “does not seek to create customary law.”27 Bufalini notes 
that the declarations of numerous other states were also intended to ensure that new 
international law obligations would not crystalize.28 He adds that the language of the 
Compact with respect to commitments is vague and implies broad state discretion in 
implementing the Compact and/or achieving its goals. Nevertheless, with respect to the 
customary status of existing human rights obligations, the Compact can be said to reflect 
evidence of states’ opinio juris; or, as Chimni put it, opinio juris communis, engaging the 
“juridical conscience of humankind.” The broad endorsement of the Compact by the UN 
General Assembly, the participation of a wide range of non-state and civil society actors, and 
the “unprecedented review of evidence and data gathered during an open, transparent and 
inclusive process”29 supports this position, and recalls the importance given to the 
deliberative/discursive element of determining opinio juris as part of an ethical, more 
 
24 The authors note that the Compact “comes with a host of non-legal implementation mechanisms. These 
‘design elements’ form an implementation framework that use non-binding norms based on technical and 
professional know-how to find the optimal mode of implementation. This sort of norm can be characterised as a 
hybrid norm, poised between the legal, the political and the technical” (11) and “could lead to domestic 
legislation, bilateral treaties, regional agreements and international instruments that contain binding legal 
norms” (15). 
25 See Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, John Cerone & Stephanie Lagoutte, Tracing the Roles of Soft Law in 
Human Rights, in THE ROLE OF SOFT LAW IN HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (Stephanie Lagoutte, Thomas 
Gammeltoft-Hansen & John Cerone, eds.2016). On this point, see also Alessandro Bufalini, The Global 
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration: What is its contribution to International Migration Law? 58 
QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (2019), who argues that “[s]oft law instruments may affect 
existing law in at least three different ways. First, soft law may confirm the existence of a certain rule, 
reaffirming and strengthening its normative value. Secondly, soft law may be of some help in construing the 
meaning of international norms. Lastly, soft law may reduce certainty about the existence of an international 
rule, thereby softening its legal status” (11).  
26 The Compact includes 23 Objectives for this purpose. For an in-detail analysis of each objective, seeElspeth 
Guild & Tugba Basaran, The UN’s Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration: Analysis of the 
Final Draft and Monitoring Implementation, REFUGEE LAW INITIATIVE (2019) available at: 
<https://rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/themed-content/global-compact-for-migration/>.  
27 United Nations, General Assembly Endorses First-Ever Global Compact on Migration, Urging Cooperation 
among Member States in Protecting Migrants, (19 December 2018), available at: 
,https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12113.doc.htm.. 
28  Alessandro Bufalini, supra note 25.. He adds that this reflects a broader trend towards the decline of 
multilateralism and States’ disengagement from international law more generally. See also, James Crawford, The 
Current Political Discourse Concerning International Law, 81 MODERN LAW REVIEW 1 (2018). 
29 See paragraph 10 of the Compact.		
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democratic, and progressive (postmodern) doctrine on customary international law. As the 
text of the Compact itself states, under “Vision and guiding principles,” the Compact “sets 
out our common understanding, shared responsibilities and unity of purpose regarding 
migration, making it work for all.” 
As discussed above, it is generally agreed that the statement at paragraph 7 of the Compact 
means what it says – the Compact is not legally binding on states. ‘Non-legally binding’ is 
generally taken as a code for something which is only a political commitment and cannot be 
relied upon in international law to require a state to do something. However, the Compact is 
politically binding on those states that have adopted it. But does that mean that those states 
which have approved, endorsed or voted for it are under no compulsion at all to do anything 
to ensure that their national law and practice is consistent with it? This of course is a matter 
for national constitutions – to what extent do political acts of states, (such as endorsing the 
Compact) have consequences within the state. We will examine this elsewhere using the UK 
as an example. We contend, however, that there is a legal relationship between political 
statements of governments made to the international community at the UN General 
Assembly, including by voting for a human rights related instrument such as the Compact, 
statements made internally to national Parliaments where the responsible Minister before or 
after the vote at the UN confirms the state’s commitment to the contents of the human rights 
related instrument and the content and application of national law and practices. But for our 
purposes here, we will examine how the Compact may affect the interpretation of 
international human rights obligations which states have (voluntarily chosen to commit 
themselves to) because the Compact itself is based on those binding international human 
rights instruments.  
Paragraph 15(f) of the Compact is as much a statement of fact as Paragraph 7 – the Compact 
is based on international human rights law. International human rights law is indeed law and 
binding on those states which have signed and ratified human rights treaties or conventions. 
There are two steps which states take to bind themselves to a convention. First, they sign it, 
often done on the day it is opened for signature to show the support of the state for the 
convention. Then there is ratification, which takes place subsequently, within the state 
according to each state’s national constitutional rules. This can range from a statement of the 
head of state to a parliamentary debate in one or two houses of parliament depending on how 
states have agreed to undertake international commitments. Once a state has ratified a 
convention it notifies the relevant registry and as a consequence, it is bound by the 
convention in international law. There are currently 18 international human rights treaties 
under the UN’s aegis. They enjoy differing levels of state ratification from the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child30 where no state has failed to sign up (though the US is 
the only state that has not yet ratified it) to the UN Convention on Migrant Workers31 where 
 
30 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 1577, p. 3, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38f0.html>.   
31 UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families, 18 December 1990, A/RES/45/158, available at: 
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3980.html>. 		
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130 states have taken no action (though 55 have ratified it and an additional 13 have signed 
it).  
The status of a convention, even one which a state has ratified, in the domestic law of the 
state is a matter for its own constitution. The relationship of national and international law is 
a field of very substantial legal scholarship which is beyond the scope of this contribution.32 
In a humble oversimplification for our purposes here, it can be summarised generally that 
some states have dualist systems of law (such as the UK) where any international convention 
which the state has ratified needs to be incorporated into national law to be legally binding 
within the state (and most importantly so that people in that state can rely on the convention 
in disputes before the courts and the courts can take into account the convention as 
incorporated). Other states have monist systems (such as the Netherlands) where upon 
ratification of a convention, it becomes part of national law and people can rely on it and 
courts can interpret national law in accordance with the ratified convention. Many states have 
systems with elements of each of these, dualist and monist systems.33 But even the strong 
proponents of dualism, such as the UK, are finding monism creeping in generally as a result 
of decision of the highest courts in respect of human rights.34  
But there is a problem with the national interpretation of international law – how can the 
international community ensure that the interpretations which nationals courts give to the 
same instrument are consistent with one another? The most traditional answer to this question 
is that in the event of divergence which troubles international relations the ICJ is available to 
give a definitive judgment. This is what will happen in the Qatar v UAE case in due course. 
The more recent and less established solution for human rights conventions is harmonisation 
through the Treaty Bodies. All human rights conventions now have a Treaty Body established 
to ensure their correct application. This takes a variety of forms including, periodic review of 
state compliance through a highly structured reporting system, the issuing of General 
Comments on provisions of conventions which are proving sources of controversy among 
states, and adjudication of individual complaints made by people who claim that a state has 
violated a human right in a convention to their detriment. This third mechanism of 
harmonisation is dependent on states formally accepting the jurisdiction of the Treaty Body 
to consider complaints by individuals against them. States which perceive their state 
sovereignty to be at risk from the incursions of the international community (such as the USA 
expressed in its 7 December 2018 statement on the Compact) rarely sign up to jurisdiction. 
But many other states do – leading to an increasingly rich body of Opinions by the Treaty 
Bodies on the application of human rights obligations in specific cases. The Treaty Bodies 
themselves have established mechanisms to enhance the authority of their Opinions through 
 
32 VEIJO HEISKANEN, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL TOPICS, (1992);  Martti Koskenniemi, International law 
and hegemony: a reconfiguration, 17:2 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF  TRANSNATIONAL LAW 464, 495-97 
(2014);; Violeta Moreno-Lax & Paul Gragl, Introduction: Beyond Monism, Dualism, Pluralism: The Quest for a 
(Fully-Fledged) Theoretical Framework: Co-Implication, Embeddedness, and Interdependency between Public 
International Law and EU Law, 35:1 YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW 455 (2016). 
33 Lando Kirchmair, The Theory of the Law Creators' Circle: Re-Conceptualizing the Monism–Dualism–
Pluralism Debate, 17:2 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 179 (2016). 
34 Melissa A. Waters, Creeping monism: The judicial trend toward interpretive incorporation of human rights 
treaties, 107 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 628 (2007). 	
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common interpretation on human rights which are transversal across a number of 
conventions. This ensures that their Opinions on the same kinds of complaints are internally 
consistent. Over the past twenty years, the status of these Opinions has been much disputed – 
are they law and even if they are law, what kind of law are they? However, increasingly 
national judges are treating these Opinions with the respect applicable to legally binding 
documents.35 
What then does the Compact mean in law in so far as it is not legally binding but is based on 
UN human rights conventions or customary international law? We are particular intrigued by 
this question because of the vehemence expressed by the US Mission to the UN against the 
Compact in its statement of 7 December 2018.  
The Compact and Human Rights Conventions 
One argument is that as the Compact is based on the human rights commitments of states, 
then while it is not legal binding in itself, many of its component parts are grounded in 
international human rights conventions. Those parts of the Compact which are so based on 
international human rights conventions must be read in light of those binding commitments in 
the conventions. The Compact in this respect is the equivalent of an authoritative 
commentary providing detail to the human right obligations of states under the relevant 
human rights convention. So, while the Compact objective does not take on legal 
characteristics, as a result of being based on a human right obligation contained in a 
convention, the human right is clarified by the Compact objective. It is the human right which 
has legal force and that force can extend as well to incorporate the Compact clarification. 
For example, the Compact states Objective 7(e), Paragraph 23: “To realize this commitment, 
[address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration] we will draw from the following actions: … 
Account for migrant children in national child protection systems by establishing robust 
procedures for the protection of migrant children in relevant legislative, administrative and 
judicial proceedings and decisions, as well as in all migration policies and programmes that 
impact children, including consular protection policies and services, as well as cross-border 
cooperation frameworks, in order to ensure that the best interests of the child are 
appropriately integrated, consistently interpreted and applied in coordination and cooperation 
with child protection authorities;”. Article 3(3) UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
states “States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for 
the care or protection of children shall conform with the standards established by competent 
authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitability of their 
staff, as well as competent supervision.” Article 22 provides for refugee children to “receive 
appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance.” When states are implementing Articles 3 
and 22 of the Convention, regard should now be had to Compact Paragraph 23 which 
 
35 Dana Baldinger, Vertical Judicial Dialogues in Asylum Cases: Standards on Judicial Scrutiny and Evidence 
in International and European Asylum Law, 36 IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW AND POLICY IN 
EUROPE (2015) The author is now a judge at the Dutch Raad van State (Supreme Court).  
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provides an explanation of what steps states should take to achieve the delivery of the 
Convention human rights to migrant children.  
Elsewhere we have set out the international human rights commitments relevant to each of 
the 23 Objectives in the Compact.36 While some Objectives have a close link to a human 
rights obligation of states, others are programmatic in nature and may have no legally related 
content at all. Further, as the signature and ratification of UN human rights conventions 
varies among states, so the relevance of the Compact as an interpretative aid to the correct 
delivery of the obligations varies. For instance, states which have not ratified the UN 
Convention on Migrant Workers will only be politically engaged by the Compact 
commitments which are based on that convention. This means that whether there is legal 
visibility of the Compact political commitment will be exclusively a matter of domestic law. 
But where a state has ratified the convention, the Compact related political commitments 
must provide guidance on the correct application of the  binding legal commitment in 
accordance, once again, with national law.   
We do not consider this approach to be startling or novel. We will discuss this further below 
when we examine the state of the art on material sources of international law. But before we 
do so, we will briefly make an a contrario argument on the basis of the rejection by the US 
Mission of the Compact and even its source, the New York Declaration. Why is the US 
Mission so exercised about the Compact? At the core of the complaint is the US concern that 
the Compact might interfere with state sovereignty in the field of immigration. There are at 
least two relevant angles to this concern. The first is the possible legal effects which we have 
referred to above which adoption of an international instrument, even one which is ostensibly 
without binding legal effect, may have on the internal legal order of states. This is a matter of 
domestic law of the state which we will not investigate here. The second is that the non-
legally binding international instrument may have some legal effect in international law. Here 
the Mission’s statement of concern regarding “new rights or protections for foreign nationals 
as a matter of conventional or customary international law” becomes important. The 
argument that we put forward here, that those parts of the Compact which elucidate 
international obligations in international human rights conventions are therefore entitled to 
some legal recognition (visibility), seems to be justified by the concerns of the Mission. But 
the antagonism of the Mission to such a consequence is by extension an antagonism towards 
the application of international human rights conventions to migrants. It is not the Compact 
which creates the rights, it is the conventions. At best the Compact clarifies what states must 
do to give effect to their obligations.  
For example, Objective 13, Paragraph 29 states “We commit to ensure that any detention in 
the context of international migration follows due process, is non-arbitrary, is based on law, 
necessity, proportionality and individual assessments, is carried out by authorized officials 
and is for the shortest possible period of time, irrespective of whether detention occurs at the 
moment of entry, in transit or in proceedings of return, and regardless of the type of place 
where the detention occurs.” The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
36 Elspeth Guild & Tugba Basaran, supra note 26.  
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(ICCPR),37 which has been ratified by 173 states (including the USA) states at Article 9 
“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds 
and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.” The Compact Objective 
takes the content of Article 9 ICCPR and makes it explicit that this human right also applies 
to migrants. This is not particularly astonishing; the UN Human Rights Committee which is 
responsible for the correct application of the ICCPR has stated in General Comment 
35(2014)38 on Article 9: “’Everyone’ includes, among others, girls and boys, soldiers, persons 
with disabilities, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons, aliens, refugees and asylum 
seekers, stateless persons, migrant workers, persons convicted of crime, and persons who 
have engaged in terrorist activity.” (emphasis provided). That the Compact makes this 
evident and develops somewhat on the limits of detention does not go beyond Article 9 
ICCPR in accordance with its interpretation by the Human Rights Committee. However, it 
does provide more detail regarding the ways in which states should implement their 
obligation. 
The USA is already bound by Article 9 ICCPR. The Human Rights Committee, in 
accordance with Article 40 ICCPR39 is charged with receiving periodically (usually every 
four or five years) reports from signatory states on their implementation of the convention. 
This reporting obligation is formalised in cycles during which specific states are invited to 
present their reports. The USA is included in the 2019 cycle. In the context of the reporting 
cycle, the Human Rights Committee provides to states a List of Issues Prior to Reporting 
(LoIPR) which sets out matters of particular concern to the Committee regarding the state’s 
compliance with the ICCPR. On 18 April 2019 the Human Rights Committee published its 
LoIPR to the USA (CCPR/C/USA/QPR/5) where it has requested: “21.  Please provide 
information on the conditions within immigrant detention facilities, both publicly and 
privately owned, including access to health care. Describe the conditions within migration 
detention facilities specifically for family units, unaccompanied minors, pregnant women and 
persons with special needs, and comment on the alleged use of “ice boxes” and of forced 
labour. In addition, provide information on the recently reported use of force by Customs and 
Border Protection officers at the southern border, including the use of tear gas, smoke and 
pepper spray on migrants, and describe any oversight mechanisms in place to limit the use of 
force by such authorities.”  
Although the USA has expressly rejected the Compact because of what is sees as possible 
negative implications for its sovereignty in the field of immigration, it remains bound by the 
underlying human rights commitments to which the Compact is, in some ways, an adjunct. 
 
37 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html>.   
38 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), General comment no. 35, Article 9 (Liberty and security of person), 16 
December 2014, CCPR/C/GC/35, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/553e0f984.html>.  
39 Article 40 “1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit reports on the measures they 
have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and on the progress made in the enjoyment of 
those rights: (a) Within one year of the entry into force of the present Covenant for the States Parties concerned;  
(b) Thereafter whenever the Committee so requests.”  
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The questions posed by the Human Rights Committee to the USA provide some interesting 
background to the statement of the US Mission of 7 December 2018. The state sovereignty in 
respect of immigration which the US authorities seem so keen to protect appears to be linked 
to a claim to act in respect of border controls and in pursuit of immigration governance 
objectives free from international human rights obligations. The US state sovereign objective 
is to enjoy an unfettered power in the form of violence against persons it classifies as 
unwanted migrants. This state sovereign claim extends to the choice not to apply rule of law 
to a number of areas of immigration, such as detention. The limitation of state sovereignty by 
international instruments is intended to protect states and their people from engaging in 
human rights abuses and ignoring the rule of law. The limitations are not an enemy of the 
state, they are evidence of an international consensus on universal legal principles which 
protect states from unlawful action. As the UN Treaty Bodies exercise their responsibilities, 
the USA will  have to respond to justify its detention of migrants without the assistance of the 
Compact guidance on agreed state options. If the USA refuses to respond, it will be in breach 
of its obligations under the ICCPR.  
The Compact and Customary International Law 
The US Mission is also concerned that the Compact may create customary international law 
(CIL) outside of a convention framework. CIL, “as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law,”40 is listed as one of the three formal law-creating mechanisms in Article 38 of the 
Statute of the ICJ. Upon reaching a threshold of consensus among States, custom achieves a 
normative force that binds states in a significant way.41 As Article 38(1)(b) lays out, 
determining custom requires both state practice and the subjective believe by states that they 
are acting to conform with a legal obligation (opinio juris);42 the frequency or habitual nature 
of the act is thus insufficient to give rise to CIL.43 Nevertheless, since elucidating the 
subjective intention of states is extremely difficult, ascertaining opinio juris necessitates 
looking at the existence of observable state practice,44 the decisions of national courts being 
of particular significance.45 Some writers thus consider that while the psychological element 
 
40 See Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.  
41 See eg. JAMES R. CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 
(8TH ed., 2015). 
42 Brownlie’s lists the following material sources of law as indicating evidence of the existence of rules which, 
when established, are binding and of general application: “diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press 
releases, the opinions of government legal advisers, official manuals on legal questions (e.g. manuals of military 
law), executive decisions and practices, orders to military forces (e.g. rules of engagement), comments by 
governments on ILC drafts and accompanying commentary, legislation, international and national judicial 
decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments (especially when in ‘all states’ form), an 
extensive pattern of treaties in the same terms, the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to 
legal questions in UN organs, notably the General Assembly” (24).  
43 See eg. ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark), Judgment, (1969) at § 77. 
44 Ibid, Dissenting Judge Tanaka at 177 et seq. 
45 ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening) ICJ REPORT 99 (2012), at 
§ 55. 
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is not required for custom, “something like it must be necessary.”46 In some cases, however, 
opinio juris has played an important role.47        
Debates over the relative need for state practice and opinio juris aside, some practical 
questions arise.48 For instance, how much state practice49 is required for CIL? Is a single act 
by a state sufficient to constitute general practice or must there be several acts over a certain 
period of time? How many states are needed? How much consistency of state practice is 
required?50 How to distinguish between mere abstention and protest? Some commentators 
stress the difficulty of evidence gathering, asking how one can possibly “canvass the virtually 
 
46 James R. Crawford, supra note 41, at 25. See also Judge Manfred Lachs who, in his dissenting opinion on the 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, declared that “to postulate that all states, even those which initiate a given 
practice, believe themselves to be acting under a legal obligation is to resort to a fiction-and in fact to deny the 
possibility of developing such rules. For the path may indeed start from voluntary, unilateral acts relying on the 
confident expectation that they will find acquiescence and be emulated … It is only at a later stage that, by the 
combined effect of individual or joint action, response and interaction in the fields concerned, i.e., of that 
reciprocity so essential in international legal relations, there developed the chain reaction productive of 
international consensus” (231). 
47 In PCIJ, S.S Lotus (France v Turkey), Judgment, 1927 PCIJ Series A no 10, ICGJ 248 (September 7, 1927), a 
particularly high standard of proof was required for opinio juris; continuous practice was insufficient. The 
judgment of the International Court of Justice reads: “even if the rarity of the judicial decisions to be found 
among the reported cases were [established] … it would merely show that States had often, in practice, 
abstained from instituting criminal proceedings, and not that they recognized themselves as being obliged to do 
so; for only if such abstention were based on their being conscious of having a duty to abstain would it be 
possible to speak of an international custom. The alleged fact does not allow one to infer that States have been 
conscious of having such a duty; on the other hand … there are other circumstances calculated to show that the 
contrary is true” (28). See also Emily Kadens & Ernest A. Young, How Customary is Customary International 
Law?, 54 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW 885 (2013). the authors conclude that “no settled customary 
practice governing how to define customary rules of law” (911) exists. In 2016, the International Law 
Commission suggested, for instance, that we distinguish between formal and material sources when determining 
CIL, citing A. Pellet’s stance that “the formal sources of international law are ‘the processes through which 
international law rules become legally relevant,’ while the material sources ‘can be defined as the political, 
sociological, economic, moral or religious origins of the legal rules,’” International Law Commission, First 
Report on Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law,  n. 56, UN Doc. A/CN.4/663 (May 17, 
2013) at 12 (prepared by Special Rapporteur Michael Wood).  
48 See eg. Andrew Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 115, 149 (2005), who notes that “the existing literature … offers a wide range of 
proposals regarding the proper balance between the opinio juris and state practice requirements.” Guzman’s 
own “rational choice approach” to CIL, for instance, does not require state practice for the establishment of a 
CIL rule. Practice is relevant to the extent that it affects the perception of states regarding the existence of a 
legal rule. See furthermore, Laszlo Blutman, Conceptual Confusion and Methodological Deficiencies: Some 
Ways that Theories of Customary International Law Fail, 25 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 529 (2014).   
49 According to Anthony Carty, the notion of “state practice” was developed as a positivist method in the 19th 
century, prior to which natural law thinking dominated international law; Anthony Carty, Doctrine Versus State 
Practice, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 974 (Bardo 
Fassbender & Anne Peters, eds., 2012). 
50 See HUGH M. KINDRED ET AL. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND 
APPLIED IN CANADA 41 (8TH ed. 2014). In the case of ICJ,  Military  and  Paramilitary  Activities  in  and  
Against  Nicaragua  (Nicaragua  v.  United States of America), Merits, Judgment, 1986 ICJREPORTS14 (June 
27, 1986) 	at	§	186,	the	ICJ	stated	that	States’	practice	with	respect	to	the	application	of	rules	need	not	be	
perfect,	in	the	sense	that	practice	had	to	be	completely	consistent,	or	be	of	an	absolutely	rigorous	
conformity. Rather, “it is sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, 
and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule, should generally have been treated as breaches 
of that rule, not as indicators of the recognition of a new rule.” In  ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State 
(Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening) 2012 ICJ Reports 99 , the ICJ used the language of a “settled practice” at 
§ 55. 
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infinite universe of potential evidence, let alone come to some understanding of the extent to 
which a practice has been followed.”51 While the most visible evidence of state practice may 
be statements made by countries or votes at international fora, their reliability is undermined 
given that states have various politically motivated incentives to misrepresent their beliefs 
about custom; the statements of some states may also be more readily available than those of 
others, introducing bias.52          
Questions also arise with respect to opinio juris. How is it to be proved? Can it be presumed 
from consistent practice? What about instances where states accept partial compliance as 
“close enough”? Guzman adds that a particularly vexing problem with opinio juris is its 
circularity. If CIL is law only if states believe it to be law, then it would appear that “opinio 
juris is necessary for there to be a rule of law, and a rule of law is necessary for there to be 
opinio juris.”53 In light of debates and difficulties with respect to determining CIL, the 
International Law Commission’s 2018 report54 on sources of customary law attempted to 
introduce some clarity. Conclusion 6 enumerates non-exhaustive forms of non-hierarchical 
state practice—physical and verbal acts and inaction—that include, for instance, “conduct in 
connection with resolutions adopted by an international organization or at an 
intergovernmental conference” and “decisions of national courts.” Such practice must be 
“sufficiently widespread and representative, as well as consistent” (see Conclusion 8). With 
respect to opinio juris, some of the acceptable forms of evidence are enumerated in 
Conclusion 10, including for instance “public statements made on behalf of States; official 
publications; government legal opinions; diplomatic correspondence; decisions of national 
courts; treaty provisions; and conduct in connection with resolutions adopted by an 
international organization or at an intergovernmental conference.” Further, failure to react 
over time may serve as evidence of opinio juris provided states had the capacity to react. As 
 
51 Andrew Guzman, supra note 48, at 126.  
52 See eg. B.S. Chimni, Customary International Law: A Third World Perspective, 112:1 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2018). On the issue of bias, Chimni argues that the “non-
availability of the state practice of third world countries, and also the paucity of scholarly writings on the 
subject, allows the identification of rules of CIL primarily on the basis of state practice of advanced capitalist 
nations and the opinions of their scholars” (6). Given the difficulty in ascertaining practice for the purpose of 
CIL, it might be easier to identify cases where practice does not arise. In Colombian-Peruvian asylum case, 
Judgment of 20 November 1950, I.C.J. Reports 1950, the ICJ stated that: “the facts … disclose so much 
uncertainty and contradiction, so much fluctuation and discrepancy in the exercise of diplomatic asylum and in 
the official views expressed on various occasions, there has been so much inconsistency in the rapid succession 
of conventions on asylum, ratified by some States and rejected by others, and the practice has been so much 
influenced by considerations of political expediency in the various cases, that it is not possible to discern in all 
this any constant and uniform usage, accepted as law, with regard to the alleged rule of unilateral and definitive 
qualification of the offence” (277).  
53 Andrew Guzman, supra note 48,at 124. See also ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971). 
54 Report of the International Law Commission seventieth session (30 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2018) 
[UN Doc A/73/10 [2018], Chapter V “Identification of Customary International Law.” For an enumeration of 
evidence to determine CIL, see also James R. Crawford, supra note 41, at 24. Material sources of custom may 
include: diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, the opinions of government legal 
advisers, official manuals on legal questions (e.g. manuals of military law), executive decisions and practices, 
orders to military forces (e.g. rules of engagement), comments by governments on ILC drafts and accompanying 
commentary, legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international 
instruments (especially when in ‘all states’ form), an extensive pattern of treaties in the same terms, the practice 
of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in UN organs, notably the General Assembly. 
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Conclusion 3 notes, “regard must be had to the overall context, the nature of the rule and the 
particular circumstances in which the evidence in question is to be found.” Conclusion 12 
turns to resolutions of international organisations and intergovernmental conferences which, 
while they cannot create a rule of CIL by themselves, “may provide evidence for determining 
the existence and content of a rule of customary international law, or contribute to its 
development.”       
While undoubtedly helpful to determining how CIL, as a formal source of international law, 
is determined, this is certainly insufficient without some state action for the Compact. On 10 
December 2018, the British Minister responsible to address Parliament on the Compact 
stated: “The GCM emphasises that migrants are entitled to the same universal human rights 
as any human being, and does not create any new “rights” for migrants. As a result, the UK 
does not interpret the compact as being in conflict with its current domestic policies. At the 
same time, the compact will help us take important steps to keep migrants around the world 
safe and to protect the most vulnerable, domestically and overseas, who can become victims 
of modern slavery.”55 This was not only a public statement made on behalf of the UK but 
made to Parliament. The essence of the statement is that not only does the UK support the 
Compact but it considers its national law and practice to be consistent with it. This certainly 
seems on its face to fulfil the conditions of Conclusion 10 of the ILC. For the purposes of the 
UK, the Compact has been endorsed in accordance with the principle of opinio juris and 
therefore may be a formal source of international law binding on the UK. 
Perhaps Tomuschat’s suggestion that “[t]he traditional categorization of sources merely 
describes the external forms to which the legal will of the community of states so far has been 
limited”56 is useful. Beyond Article 38, norm creation reflects a “process of continuous 
interaction, of continuous demand and response”57 involving recognition, toleration, simple 
acceptance, and the dispute of claims and situations. It is perhaps such a perspective that has 
motivated the “modern” approach to CIL.58 This approach adopts both an inclusive notion of 
state practice (including, for instance, resolutions of international organizations) and 
emphasizes opinio juris over state practice.59 Opinio juris is considered a cultural concept 
changing over time which lends itself to the gradual expansion of the set of norms that are 
 
55 The Minister for the Middle East (Alistair Burt), Global Compact for Migration, (10 December 2018) House 
of Commons Hansard, available at: <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2018-12-
10/debates/1812106000015/GlobalCompactForMigration>.  
56 Christian Tomuschat, Verfassungsgewohnheitsrecht? (1972), cited in Eibe Riedel, Standards and Sources: 
Farewell to the Exclusivity of the Sources Triad in International Law, 2:1 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 58, 64 (1991)..  
57 Eibe Riedel, supra note 56, at 64. 
58 See eg. B.S. Chimni, supra note 52; and Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to 
Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95:4 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 757  (2001).  
59 See eg Roozbeh (Rudy) B. Baker, Customary International Law: A Reconceptualization, 41 BROOKLYN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 439 (2016).See also Roozbeh (Rudy) B. Baker, Customary 
International Law in the 21st Century: Old Challenges and New Debates,21 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 173 (2010), who states that “the debate over whether consistent state practice and 
opinio juris are the only building blocks of customary international law is over, because clearly, for better or for 
worse, they no longer are” (175).   
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considered as CIL,60 particularly with respect to human rights;61 the “modern” approach may 
thus reflect an “ethical turn”62 in the debate about CIL to address the “deep democratic 
deficit”63 of formulating CIL. Chimni’s postmodern doctrine of CIL goes further, suggesting 
that norm creation should foreground the procedural ideal of “deliberative reason,” thereby 
ensuring that CIL rests on “better argument or sounder claims advanced by state and non-
state actors [involving] claims and counterclaims, challenges and responses.”64   
  
A democratic and deliberative process would allow opinio juris to represent the “juridical 
conscience of humankind,” an opinio juris communis.65 Given the importance of the 
discursive element in the postmodern doctrine, resolutions of international organizations—the 
“outcome of extended negotiations, broad consensus, clear articulation, and subsequent 
affirmations”66—would yield rules of CIL. Special weight is given to the “global common 
good”67 in determining whether a resolution has binding effect as CIL. Furthermore, the 
views of transnational and non-governmental groups, those of trade unions and peasant 
organizations or the World Social Forum (WSF), might be considered in the emergence of 
norms of CIL.68 Such a development of CIL might well startle the US Mission to the UN and 
incite it to denounce the Compact. Yet, as is clear from the authorities, there is plenty of room 
for dispute in the areas of CIL and its formulation.  
Conclusions 
 
60 B.S. Chimni, supra note 52,at 3. He also writes that “the genesis of the doctrine of CIL can be traced to the 
emergence of Europe as a legal community, common European values, the positivist method, and the needs of 
nineteenth century imperialism” (20). 
61 See eg. Isabelle R. Gunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The Challenge of Human Rights, 
31:2 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 211 (1991). 
62 B.S. Chimni, supra note 52, at 3. According to Chimni, “[t]he turn to opinio juris among proponents of 
modern CIL is in many ways a response to the expanded community of states which makes dependence on state 
practice problematic, necessitating reliance on ethical reasoning” (18). He contends also, however, that “the 
distinction between “traditional” and “modern” CIL has been advanced to allow its rapid development to fill 
critical gaps in the international legal system in the era of neoliberal capitalist globalization … “Modern” CIL 
rules embody “hegemonic” ideas and beliefs that are critical to realizing the systemic interests of the global 
capitalist system. These ideas and beliefs have come to be internalized by third world nations in the postcolonial 
era.” (7). 
63 Ibid, at 22. 
64 Ibid, at 38. 
65 Ibid, at 38. See also dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade in ICJ, Obligations Concerning 
Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. 
India), Judgment, (October 5, 2016).  
66 B.S. Chimni, supra note 52, at 41.  
67 Ibid, at 42, noting that the “global common good” reflects opinio juris communis and furthers the goals of 
international human rights law and associated jurisprudence.	
68 Chimni refers here to Reisman who argues that, in practice, the makers of CIL are no longer only state 
governments, and that “many categories of non-State actors in the different social and economic zones of the 
complex archipelagos of contemporary international law now participate in shaping expectations and demands 
of right behaviour;” see W. Michael Reisman, Canute Confronts the Tide: States Versus Tribunals and the 
Evolution of the Minimum Standard in Customary International Law, 30:3 ICSID REVIEW - FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT LAW JOURNAL 616, 619 (2015).. See also, generally, Laura Pedraza-Farina, Conceptions of 
Civil Society in International Lawmaking and Implementation: A Theoretical Framework, 34 MICHIGAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 605 (2013).  
19 
 
In this article we have examined the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular 
Migration as an element of international law. In order to do so we first looked at the 
statement that it is non-legally binding. Our argument is that while the Compact is non-
legally binding, the underlying human rights conventions on which it is based are binding. 
Those parts of the Compact which are clearly linked to legally binding commitments must be 
read as authoritative guidance on the correct application of those obligations. Secondly, we 
examined what it means that the Compact is based on the principle of non-regression and 
non-discrimination. Non-regression expressed a standstill objective which prevents states 
from reducing the standard of treatment of migrants below what it is at the time of adoption. 
This may well mean that there are differing standards in neighbouring states which are all 
protected by the Compact’s non-regression principle. Non-discrimination is a more complex 
principle when applied to border control and migration governance as inherent in both 
activities is the principle that foreigners can be treated disadvantageously in comparison with 
citizens. But the extent of that differential treatment is currently subject to judicial 
consideration by the ICJ. We then turn to the Compact problem – what is a compact in 
international law – and once again our conclusions draw us back to the inherent relationship 
of the compact with human rights obligations of states. Finally, we examine the compact as a 
possible source of CIL. The force of the Compact in this context depends on the commitment 
which state authorities have made to it.  
It is evident that from the commencement of the process substantial changes took place as 
regards the legal and political importance of the Compact. The political winds which buffeted 
the negotiations led to a watered-down wording of its legal impact. But the framework of the 
Compact as an adjunct to international human rights conventions, setting new standards as 
regards their application to migrants, has remained constant. 
 
    
